Consciousness and the m ind are prescientific concepts that begin w ith Greek theorizing. They suppose hum an rationality and reasoning placed in the hum an head by (in Christian term s) God , w ho structured the universe he created w ith the sam e kind of und erlying characteristics. Descartes" d evelopm ent of the m od el includ ed scientific objectivity by placing the m ind outsid e the physical universe. In its failure und er evid ential scrutiny and w ithout physical explanation, this m od el is d estined for term inal d ecline. Instead , a genuine biologica l and physical function for the brain phenom enon can be d eveloped . This is the theory of brain-sign. It accepts the causality of the brain as its physical characteristics, alread y und er scientific scrutiny. What is need ed is a new neurophysiological m apping language that specifies the relation of the structure and operation of the brain to organism ic action in the w orld . Still w hat is lacking is an account of how neurophysiologies in d ifferent organisms com m unicate on d ynam ic, i.e. unpred ictable, tasks. It is this evolved capacity that has em erged as brain-sign. Thus rather than m entality being an inner epistem ological parallel w orld sud d enly appearing in the head , brain -sign, as the neural sign of the causal status of the brain, facilitates the com m unicative m ed ium of otherw ise isolated organism s. The biogenesis of the phenom enon em erges d irectly from the account of the physical brain, and functions as a m onistic feature of organism s in the physical w orld. This new parad igm offers d isciplinary com patibility, and genuine d evelopm ent in behavioral and brain sciences.
IN TROD UCTION
In 2004, BBS (Behavioral and Brain Sciences) p u blished tw o p articu lar p ap ers consecu tively for review (27:5) . It w as becau se of their content, I exp ect, that an ed itorial d ecision w as m ad e abou t this ju xtap osition. The p ap ers w ere: W hat to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists, by Don Ross and David Sp u rrett; and The Illusion of Conscious W ill, by Daniel Wegner. The Ross/ Sp u rrett p ap er concerns the significance of consciou s cau sation to the nam ed sciences (thou gh the w ord mental is u sed p red om inantly rather than conscious), and the Wegner p ap er (a p récis from his book, 2002) p rop oses that consciou s w ill is not cau sal.
These p ap ers, and the com m entaries on them , reasonably rep resent asp ects of the cu rrent state of the top ic of consciou sness. Thu s they are a convenient starting p oint for thi s p ap er, thou gh of cou rse that is not the lim it of reference.
For, cu rrent thou gh they m ay be, they are both enm eshed in w hat this p ap er w ill p ortray as a fu nd am ental biological error su stained in Western theorizing from the Greeks onw ard s. Once the sp ecifically physical biology of organism s is clarified , their p rescientific d iscou rse can be seen to be m istaken. What can rep lace them is the biological ontology and fu nction of the brain p henom enon w ith w hich they have been confu sed . The p henom enon w ill be term ed brain-sign.
This p ap er p resents (in severely attenu ated form ) the theory of brain -sign. With this theory w e have a m eans of p lacing behavior and the brain in the p hysical w orld .
CON SCIOUSN ESS AN D THE MIN D
Over the last fifty years, the statu s of consciou sness in the p hysical u niverse has been keenly d ebated . The Ross/ Sp u rrett p ap er engages in this d ebate d irectly. The thru st of the p ap er concerns the p osition d evelop ed over the years by Jaegw on Kim . As Kim says in his m ore recent book (2005) , his concern has been the alternatives for consciou sness: that in the p hysical u niverse, either it can be red u ced and is cau sal, or it is ep ip henom enal, in w hich case it is not cau sal. The d ifficu lty is, if w e w ish to hold onto the notion that consciou sness is cau sal, how is it to be red u ced ?
The Wegner p ap er, by contrast, is concerned w ith the em p irical evid ence, am assed at length, ind icating that, w hatever w e m ay su p p ose w e are d oing as consciou s su bjects, w e are not cau sing anything in the p hysical u niverse by w ill. Thu s consciou sness and cau sation are ad d ressed in these tw o p ap ers from d ifferent ap p roaches.
Initial remarks
In Kim "s 2005 book, he says of consciou sness: "Of cou rse, if ou r schem e of concep ts w ere rad ically altered , the p roblem s w ou ld be as w ell…. To m otivate the d iscard ing of a concep t, w e need ind ep end ent reasons-w e shou ld be able to show it to be d eficient, or flaw ed in som e fu nd am ental w ay, ind ep end ently of the fact that it generates p u zzles and p roblem s that w e are u nable to d eal w ith" (p . 30).
The concep t or theory of consciou sness has been a p roblem from its incep tion. Ind eed , Kim "s rem ark is cu riou s. For one m ight su p p ose that the p u zzles and p roblem s w ere gu id es to the reasons w hy the concep t shou ld be d iscard ed . H ow ever, Kim believes there are no su ch reasons. H e continu es: "It m ay w ell be that the p roblem is an inexorable consequ ence of the tension betw een the objective w orld of p hysical existence and the su bjective w orld of exp erience, and that the d istinction betw een the objective and su bjective is u navoid able for reflective cognizers and agents of the kind that w e are" (p 30/ 31). It is ap p arent that Kim sim p ly assu m es the su bjective/ objective natu re of consciou sness w ithou t consid ering w hether this very d ivision is not a reason for d iscard ing the concep t. After all, since Kim accep ts the p hysical u niverse as w hat is, one m ight qu estion w hether there is su bjectivity in the p hysical u niverse. And since it is consciou sness that generates the objective for us (su p p osed ly), one m ight w ond er w hether w e really d o "have access to" the objective.
(This is not the ap p roach to Kim that Ross/ Sp u rrett ad op t. The m ain thru st of their attack on Kim "s p osition is his su p p osition that fu nd am ental p hysicality, as is now conceived by p hysicists, involves the notion of cau sality at all.) Discard ing consciou s w ill, as Wegner p rop oses, is actu ally a step in d iscard ing consciou sness, thou gh Wegner ap p ears not to ap p reciate this. (I.e. the consciou sness m od el is fatally broken.) In his resp onse to the com m entary on his p ap er, he states w hy there is su ch strong reaction, in som e qu arters, to his p rop osal that consciou s w ill is illu sory. It is becau se ou r ow n exp erience is being controverted . "The exp erience of consciou s w ill is, of cou rse, the basis of the intu ition w e all have that w e cau se ou r actions" (p . 681). H ow ever, w hat is rem arkable is that Wegner m akes a cau sal d istinction betw een this exp erience, this feeling, and thou ght. H e says that "Thou ghts must cau se action… This is the em p irical w ill as d efined in ICW . It is only w hen w e ad d the experience of conscious will to the system that everything becom es m u rky. H eym an [a com m entator] rep orts that ICW overlooks "the objective basis for the sensation." It d oes so becau se the book sim p ly assu m es intelligent goal-seeking behavior on the p art of hu m ans. The exp erience of su ch behavio r is the issu e" (ibid ., original em p hasis).
In this excerp t Wegner d oes not exp lain ou r exp erience of consciou s w ill in any ontological sense. N or d oes he tell u s how thou ght is red u cible to p hysicality (as Kim w ou ld requ ire) that it m ay be cau sal. N or d oes he tell u s w hy intelligent goal-seeking behavior, w hich is p resu m ably associated w ith thou ght, shou ld be objective. What d oes objective entail here, and sp ecifically as thou ght? H e d oes tell u s that "The feeling of d oing establishes a "d oer," not only au thenticating the self bu t constru cting the self from w hat w as p reviou sly thin air" (p 680/ 681). Bu t he d oes not tell u s how a feeling establishes a d oer (w hat d oes this m ean?), or w hat authenticating entails (w hat au thenticates w hat and to w hom and by w hat m eans?), or w hat constru cting a self from thin air cou ld p ossibly entail in any scientific or ontological sense. And w hat has all this to d o w ith a brain, the ap p arent sou rce of all this m ysteriou s hap p ening?
When the com m entators Bogen and Raz & N orm an com p lain that Wegner"s p iece lacks neu roscience, Wegner p lead s that he is w riting as a social cognitive p sychologist. Bu t his consoling reference to im aging stu d ies ("exciting new ventu res", e.g. Ito"s cerebellu mm ed iated internal feed back, p . 686) is highly sp ecu lative, since neu rop sychology cond u cted by cu rrent fMRI im aging has no identified method by w hich correlations can be m ad e betw een w hat a su bject exp eriences and w hat is illu m inated . I.e. if there is to be a d ivision betw een p hysical cau ses (Wegner often calls these unconscious cau ses) and exp eriencing as Wegner claim s (as ind eed m ay be the case, bu t the latter m u st be still p hysical), then w hat is illu m inated in the im age cannot be assigned de facto to exp eriencing, bu t w ill likely be w hat is actu ally cau sal. After all, exp eriencing (so-called ) is p ervasive, and w hy shou ld w e not su p p ose that exp eriencing be d ifferentiated from cau sal p rocesses in the brain im age, or m ore rad ically, exp erience of e.g. thou ght be not d ifferentiated from other exp eriencing? Moreover, if w hat m u st be d ifferentially ap p arent are the action-related p hysical cau ses in the brain, are they in fact thou ght? [This is a d irect challenge to this kind of statem ent by Stent (2005) . "Probably the m ost p rom ising…m ethod of ad vancing ou r u nd erstand ing of the biological basis of ou r thou ghts and feelings is brain im aging, w hich p erm its the observation of…the very p arts of the living brain that are involved in the generation of m ental p henom ena" (p 146), reconstru cted from original text.]
There is ind icative evid ence for the d ivision here. In the im aging referred to by N eville et al. (1998) , "sp eech" areas of the brain are illu m inated by hearing su bjects read ing, bu t also illu m inated by d eaf p eop le w atching Am erican Sign Langu age (ASL), viz. the Broca and Wernicke areas in the left hem isp here. In ad d ition, how ever, the su p erior tem p oral gyru s on the right hem isp here is active in resp onse to ASL in d eaf su bjects, an area that w ou ld be activated in hearing su bjects listening to langu age. We m ig ht conclu d e that the left hem isp here illu m ination d oes not necessarily involve exp erience, since it is d ifferent for each, bu t cau sal langu age p rocessing w hich is com m on. We m ight also conclu d e that for hearing w atchers, w hat would be cau sing the illu m ination in the right hem isp here of hearers hearing is not the exp erience (since there is none), bu t cau sal fu nction replicated by ASL w atchers w ho cannot hear. For hearing su bjects com p etent in ASL also have the area illu m inated w hen w atching ASL. Fu rther exam p les are in the footnote. 1 1 (1) Physical damage can occur without a subject feeling pain, i.e. even though signaling is taking place to, and in, the brain from the damaged areas; and pain can occur without there being any physical damage. See e.g. Wall 1999 for extensive discussion. His conclusion: "The classical theory is that the brain analyses the sensory input to determine what has happened and presents the answer as pure sensation. I propose an alternative theory: that the brain analyses the input in terms of what action Alread y w e find no science in view , for there is no d om ain of d iscou rse in w hich the grou nd ru les, and id entifiable law fu l com p onents, are com m only scientifically accep ted (cf. Ku hn"s notion of "norm al science ", 1962) . Ind eed , no agreed exp lanation exists for how consciou sness is to be red u ced (cf. Kim 2003, p . 152) , or m ore fu nd am entally, w hat consciou sness is in any scientific sense (e.g. Seager 1999; Pap ineau 2003) . 
Analysis
The Ross/ Sp u rrett p ap er is concerned to p reserve key featu res of cognitive science, u nd erstood as fu nctionalism . They regard Kim "s red u ctionist p rop osal for fu nctionalism as d estru ctive of the very notion of fu nctionalism . They say: "By functionalism w e u nd erstand any p osition that assigns seriou s ontological statu s to typ es or states of p rocesses ind ivid u ated by reference to w hat they do rather than w hat they are made of-that is by reference to their effects, rather than (necessarily) their constitu ents" (p . 604). The assu m p tion is that m ental states are fu nctional states. Su ch a state cou ld be a thou ght, as Wegner has it. In the cam p of som e theoreticians, it m ay be d istingu ished from a feeling, as of consciou s w ill, w hich is cau sally p roblem atic becau se of its su bjectivity. With som e theoreticians the p roblem of su bjective states certainly ap p lies to qu alia (e.g. Block 1995; Chalm ers 1996) . Ross/ Sp u rrett intend to p reserve cau sal ascrip tion to m ental states, and p resu m ably they w ou ld class a feeling as fu nctional and cau sal too: they d ep lore Chalm er s" conservative m etap hysics that resu lts in d u alism , they say.
Bu t w ithou t taking biology into accou nt, is fu nctionalism a valid ap p roach, not m erely in term s of biology"s cap acity to realize m ental states as cau sal p hysicality, bu t in end orsing the concep t of m entality at all? Or, co-op ting David Martel Johnson"s w ord s, "Com p ared w ith stru ctu ralist and behaviorist investigators they claim to have refu ted , p resent -d ay cognitivists are not in as good a p osition to p rop ose and d efend any single, p recise conce p t of w hat the m ind is" (2005, p . 5). Su rely w ithou t a p recise and biological concep t of the m ind , p u rsu ing a scientific them e is fu tile. Is it not reasonable to say that cognitive science (as Ross/ Sp u rrett conceive it), w ith its m entalist assu m p tions, is batting on the w rong w icket; that the revolu tion Chom sky w as a m ajor p layer in initiating, from behaviorism back to m entalism , w as the w rong m ove? 3 I am going to raise three fu nd am ental objections to m ental states.
The cultural/historical derivation
It m ight seem hard ly necessary to p oint ou t that the notion of m ental states d oes not d erive from a scientific view of the u niverse. That w e live w ith a cu ltu ral assu m p tion abou t the m ind is su rely w id ely u nd erstood . Bu t cu rrent d iscou rse ind icates th at its significance is not u nd erstood at all. would be appropriate" (p176).
(2) For discussion of anomalies where brain activation in the ventral stream processing areas may or may not generate visual experience, see e.g. Dehaene & Naccache, 2001 , and discussion of their paper (and others) by Block in the same volume. But the conclusion we draw is not that experiencing requires an additional neural X; nor is there a multiple conscious possibility-phenomenality, access or reflexivity-as does Block. Rather there are two different neural functions, as discussed subsequently.
(3) The claim by Andy Clark and Jesse Prinz (2004, p67 ) that the recently well-publicized capacity of a paralyzed patient to move a cursor about on a screen is by thought (a supposition widely assumed in the press), as a result of electrodes inserted in the brain, is quite unfounded. As we shall propose, what causes the move of the cursor are the physical brain states at which the electrodes are directed, and the sense of thought is a resulting reporting of the brain status, but not to a causal mental subject. 2 It is fairly common practice not even to specify what is meant by consciousness, but to proceed as if it is an adequately accepted scientific fact. This is true of the Churchlands (PM 1995 , PS 2002 , and Christoph Koch (2004) . J Graham Beaumont (1999) states more appositely: "Neuropsychology is in a conceptual morass. Neuropsychologists seek to study the relation between brain and mind, but without really addressing the status of these two constructs, or what potential form the relation between them might take" (p527). 3 A key document referred to is Chomsky"s (1959) review of B.F. Skinner"s Verbal Behavior. Skinner"s behaviorism was tied to too limited a set of underlying notions. Language is discussed here at 3.2.4.
To be extrem ely synop tic: The m ind begins w ith the Greeks. The theory is that p laced in the hu m an head is a corresp ond ence to w hat lies behind the p hysical w orld , nous (intelligence, reason, etc.) corresp ond ing to the u niverse"s N ous, and logos ([logical] thou ght/ sp eech) corresp ond ing to the u niverse"s Logos. In the Christian version, God , being the creator of the u niverse, natu rally "thou ght" the essence of things, and this kind of cap acity w as p laced by him w ithin, or as, the hu m an m ind . (Further below 2.2.3, & note 6.) With Descartes, the id ea is d evelop ed , based u p on the m ed ieval integration of the Greek id eas w ith the Christian sou l. N ow the intellect, and sensation and feeling, are p rop erties of the hu m an m ind . Its cap acities are end orsed sp ecifically by God . Thu s Descartes can claim both objectivity (for science), becau se w hat he thinks is u nd erp inned by God w ho has m ad e everything and therefore knows it, and p rop er ontology, becau se the m ind is not p art of the p hysical u niverse bu t in a sp iritu al realm rou ghly equ ivalent to God , w hich is how thou ght (id eas) can be objective and certain. Egoism (my sou l) becom es (p roblem atically) a them e of Western p hilosop hy/ p sychology. N ow Ross/ Sp u rrett and Wegner, and Kim too, m ay su p p ose w e "natu rally" think the w ay w e d o abou t the m ind . Bu t "natu rally" here cannot m ean "u nalloyed by the Greek/ Christian trad ition". We m ay p ay lip service to the notion that the m ind m u st be p hysical, bu t w e re tain in large p art p recisely the Greek/ Christian trad ition (inclu d ing m aterialists like, yes, Dennett (1991a; and the Chu rchland s (PM 1995; PS 2002) ).
In Kim "s ap p roach there is a m ind and it is p roblem atically related to the p hysical w orld , and there are only tw o op tions concerning it: Either it is red u cible or ep ip henom enal. Bu t this very sp ecification of the m ind m ay be seen as a false d ichotom y via the Greek/ Christian trad ition. For nothing in that trad ition bears any relation to the p hysical u ni verse. I.e., althou gh su bsequ ent to Descartes there has been d issolu tion of asp ects of his theory, in p rincip le it rem ains as it alw ays w as-abou t another kind of existent.
After all, w hat cau ses u s to think as w e d o abou t the m ind (trad itional or not) m u st itself be a p hysical p rocess, and to su p p ose w e have an op tion abou t w hat w e think -that w e (the m ind ) have som e freed om in this by contrast w ith states of the p hysical u niverse (a Kantian (1781, 1789) d istinction solid ly w ithin the trad ition)-is alread y to d eny the characteristics of the p hysical u niverse. Part of com ing to grip s w ith the p hysical u niverse as w hat is involves ap p reciating w h at "being a trad ition" entails, and w hat any theory can be for u s as p hysical organism s.
The p oint here is that, becau se of ou r cu ltu ral attachm ent to consciou sness and the m ind , a biological analysis of the neu rop hysiological p henom enon w ithin the term s o f the p hysical u niverse is actu ally obfu scated .
The predicament
Both Kim and Wegner assu m e that w e have self-know led ge. In Kim "s term s w e are "reflective cognizers", and in Wegner"s term s w e exp erience (i.e. w e are know ingly aw are of) ou r consciou s w ill. Thu s there is a state of consciou sness and there is a state of consciou sness of it. This is Descartes" m od el in that the m ind "s su bject can interrogate (reflectively) its content, w here the content p reced es (stru ctu rally) the ensu ing interrogatio n.
Since Dennett u ses the term "m ind ", w e shou ld p resent his m aterialist p osition of "m ental content". Dennett (1991a Dennett ( , 1991b ) p rop oses the brain rep resents (a "real p attern"), and it (i.e. not a self) is a ju d gm ent that can be cau sal as a rep resentation (or, again, a d iscrim ination). By elim inating the consciou s self (ontologically) in this w ay, Dennett intend s to rem ove the p roblem atic asp ects of su bjectivity (inclu d ing an infinite regress of hom u ncu lu s exp lanation), and coincid entally the p ossibility of p henom enology, i.e. the p rivileged interior availability of content to the self, the Cartesian Theater as he has styled it.
Bu t the qu estion is not w hether prima facie these accou nts cou ld be u nd erstood as p hysically realizable, bu t w hether the (m entalist) w ord s knowledge or judgment u sed in the accou nts ap p ly to (p hysical) biological organism s. And m ore p recisely: To the biological organism ic p henom enon that is m e. What is p ointed to here is the predicament w e face in being this p henom enon in the p hysical w orld .
H ere is a sp ecific exam p le of the p red icam ent. I stand before a tree. I see the tree. What I see, how ever, is not w hat is there. I am in a m ental state w hich has the tree as its p ercep tu al content. The p ercep tu al state, w hich I call seeing the tree, is actu ally an artifact of m y brain. I have no w ay of escap ing m y p osition to verify either that the tree I see is w hat is there, or that I see it. More p recisely, the state of experiencing (so-called ) w hich I am is also the state of appearing w hich is of both the tree and m yself; and the latter is as the exp eriencer of the tree and of m yself (reflectively). In other w ord s, althou gh it m ight seem that I react to the tree becau se I see it, and I react to it as su ch, in m y p red icam ent I cannot escap e to the realm of know led ge or ju d gm ent (that Kim et al. or Dennett claim ) becau se I cannot exit m y cond ition as w hich I am (so-called ) exp erience and ap p earance. Ind eed , the very claim that m y m ental state is cau sal, either as a know led ge cap acity of p ercep tion, o r a ju d gm ent of m y brain, d ep end s for its p lau sibility u p on a cond ition to w hich I cannot asp ire. For m e (the p henom enon), there is no ind ep end ent level for m y cau sal claim . This is not a hop eless situ ation. It is not hop eless (in this sense) becau se clear ly w e go on: w e exist now and w e w ill tom orrow . Things w ork (as they d o for ap es, d ogs, fish, w orm s, am oeba, etc.). H ow ever, there is an analogy to be fou nd in ou r p red icam ent w ith the Cop ernican revolu tion. Placed as w e w ere u p on the earth, w e cou ld not s ee (p ercep tu ally) that the earth goes rou nd the su n. Bu t by scientific enqu iry, w e cou ld find evid ence for it. Ou r p red icam ent here (m ore fu nd am entally) is as exp eriencers-ap p earers. What w e need is a theory w hich d eals w ith the p red icam ent as the brain has engineered it, one for w hich there is evid ence.
What w e cannot d o by contrast (bu t is the Greek/ Christian trad ition), is p resu p p ose that ou r exp eriencing-ap p earing gives u s the concep ts of the m ental, inclu d ing its cau sality, becau se w e cannot take for granted , biologically, that anything can be p resu p p osed abou t w hat the p henom enon is. After all, science inform s u s that the colors w e see d o not exist in the w orld ; that the u niverse is not three d im ensional as it ap p ears; that the solid objects w e see are actu ally regions of sp ace p op u lated by highly active m icrostru ctu ral u nits; and so on. Ind eed , as Wegner"s book illu strates, and Freu d p rop osed a hu nd red years ago, it is often the case that there is no correlation betw een ou r exp erience-ap p earance (inclu d ing thou ght!) and w hat w e d o. We cannot ju st refine ou r notion of m ental states (e.g. d ivid e them into the consciou s and non-consciou s). We m u st find a biological theory that clarifies the p henom enon fu nd am entally. And that is p roblem atic, for the p henom enon cannot p rovid e u s w ith its self-interp retation: the p red icam ent ind icates that w e cannot assu m e an us, the egoistic (m ental) know er or (p hysical!) ju d ger, to w hom it cou ld d o so. To rep eat, the Greek/ Christian trad ition is not fou nd ed on the p rincip les of a p hysical u niverse. and hence for achieving long-lasting effects-or as we misleadingly say, "entering into memory." And since we are talkers, and since talking to ourselves is one of our most influential activities, one of the most effective ways for a mental content to become influential is for it to get into the position to drive the language-using parts of the controls" (1996, pp205/206). 1) How does the brain ("mere" physical states) create (synthesize?) "mental content"? 2) How do (Oliver Selfridge"s) mental contents compete with each other and win: i.e. by what physical process as content? [3) Dennett"s notion of "celebrity" for mental content is consciousness defining itself in its own terms, not explaining itself by an ontologically more fundamental process.] 4) How does content enter into memory, even if we misleadingly so specify it? 5) How do we talk to ourselves? Who is doing what to whom? (We understood there was no self.) 6) How is behavior controlled by mental content: i.e. once having become content (e.g. a belief), how does this (as yet unexplained) physicality as intentional exercise physical control of motor actions? 7) What does "drive the language using parts of the controls" entail in any physically expressible sense? And so on. The imprecision in Dennett"s presentation, by which he claims to be talking of physicality yet slides seamlessly into mentalist and personal terms, gives the lie to the fact that he has any physical theory (a point made by e.g. Seager 1999), but is rather strenuously trying to subvert Cartesian materialism amongst his contemporaries. Interestingly, in his comments (2004), he criticizes Wegner for precisely the same ontological imprecision.
The physical universe
N ow w e note w hat the p red icam ent seem s to im p ly. Is all enqu iry hop eless becau se w e cannot p lace the fu nction of consciou sness, the fu nction u p on w hich w e su p p osed ly rely to fou nd ou r know led ge, and w hich in ou r everyd ay activity w e rely u p on to act? N o, w e stated , becau se things ap p ear to go on w orking, inclu d ing som e of ou r theories. Bu t it seem s very d ifficu lt to su p p ose the theories w e have abou t the u niverse that seem to w ork d o not rely u p on the fact that w e seem to have them : e.g. the theory of sp ecial relativity of w hich I am now thinking. Even if w e have no convincing exp lanation of how the brain can generate, or be, this thou ght, how can w e d eny this thou ght exists? I am having it now ! What the p red icam ent exam p le d em onstrates, how ever, is that the conviction of ou r having this thou ght (or seeing this tree) is itself p laced w ithin a biological actu ality to w hich the conviction (the state of being convinced or certain) cannot access. The p red icam ent m ight be held to lead to Cartesian d ou bt or H u m ean skep ticism , bu t it is neither of those. It is alread y a constru ct in a biological theory of the brain in a p u rely p hysical w orld ; a theoretical p osition w hich su bverts the claim that consciou sness m u st be self-revealing of itself, the w orld and ou rselves, and other attribu tes like its cau sality. The theory ind icates that Kim "s fou nd ational p oint abou t consciou sness, i.e. objectivity vs. su bjectivity, is not p resu p p osable, since Kim w ou ld first have to have a biological theory of the p henom enon to m ake su ch a claim , if he really acknow led ges the p hysical u niverse is w hat is.
The p hysical u niverse, as science conceives it, exists as the p rop erties of m ass/ energy sp ace-tim e. It constantly changes as its cond itions change. It is at each instant. A featu re of the p hysical u niverse is biological organism s. They, too, are at each instant. They evolve in the m anner of natu ral selection; they su rvive by their fitness in the environm ent, and their ability to rep rod u ce. The fu nction of organism s, if one can ascribe fu nction to them , is to su rvive and rep rod u ce. Their ad ap tational cap ability is a factor in their su rvival. A factor in their ad ap tational cap ability is their m em ory, rend ering behavior m od ification acco rd ing to p reviou s interaction w ith the environm ent. Mem ory, as initially id entified by Donald H ebb (1949) (i.e. before he tu rned it into neu rop sychology), m eans neu ral m od ification. Behavior, or action, is w hat enables su rvival by the organism . Behavior is not only m od ified interaction w ith the environm ent; it is also learned by interaction w ith p arents and others. Learning is the m od ification of neu ral stru ctu re, and the recent id entification of mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al. 1996) has given su p p ort to this notion. N ow here in this extrem ely synop tic version of organism ic biology as p hysicality is there a p lace for a cau sal psyche, or p sychology-p ercep tions, thou ghts, feelings, sensations, beliefs/ d esires, etc. The p roblem for u s in grasp ing the actu ality of the p hysical u niverse (ap p arently, bu t this is the Greek/ Christian su p p osition) is that w e (as the p henom enon) seem to inhabit a d ifferent state from it. Bu t there are tw o analogies that m ay help u s m ove beyond this: the first, alread y m entioned , Cop er nicu s vs. the Aristotelian/ Ptolem aic u niverse; the second , Darw in"s evolu tionary theory w hich d iscou nted any p rivilege to hu m ans in their biological em ergence.
We m u st ad d to ou r p red icam ent as the brain p henom enon, as so far d iscu ssed . For not only can w e not ju stify ou r theories by (the m entalist p rop erties of) know led ge or ju d gm ent becau se of the natu re of ou r p red icam ent; in fact w e cannot su p p ose any cau sal p rop erty exists for the organism from the p henom enon for p recisely the sam e reason. As the p henom enon, I am in being at each instant, like everything else in the p hysical u niverse. N othing I am as the p henom enon cau ses m y next ap p earance and the ap p earance of the w orld as m e as the p henom enon. I d o not cau se m y ap p earance as the p henom enon w hen born, and I d o not cau se its d issolu tion w hen I d ie, and I cau se nothing in betw een. What cau ses m y ap p earance is the p hysicality w hich it is, and to argu e that the p henom enon is a p hysicality (called the m ental) and thu s is cau sal is alread y to separate it out from p hysicality to id entify its cau sality, w hich is qu ite absu rd if one accep ts that the p henom enon is p hysical.
If there is cau sality for the organism as p hysicality, it lies in the p rop erties of m ass/ energy sp ace-tim e; and w hilst there m ay be p rop erties of consciou sness w hich cannot be accou nted as cau sal p hysicality for the organism , that d oes m ean the brain p henom enon is not p hysical, becau se its p rop erties cou ld entail cau sality in another w ay. 5 In that w ay of being, the p henom enon can be entirely red u cible as (i.e. not to) p hysicality as Kim requ ires, bu t still not be cau sal for the organism and not ep ip henom enal.
This argu m ent shou ld be qu ite accep table to Kim , becau se he begins his accou nt from this p osition: the d istinction betw een vertical and horizontal cau sality, from his m entor Jonathan Ed w ard s (Kim 2005, p . 36-38) . The p roblem is, Kim d oes not think in term s of biology, bu t entirely w ithin the Greek/ Christian trad ition, and that is a hop eless fram ew ork for interp reting the organism in the p hysical u niverse. What w e need here, to rem ove the im p asse, and id entify how w e can genu inely arrive at a science (and u nd erstand w hat a science can be for u s as p hysical organism s, and w hat the w ord "u nd erstand " entails, & etc.), is a Ku hnian (1962) change of p arad igm .
Summary
It is not, as Wegner says, that ou r exp erience of the w ill m akes u s think it cau sal. The m etap hor for consciou sness, stretching back at least to the Greeks, is being in the light. 6 We (as organism s) are illu m inated in the w orld lit u p for u s as consciou sness. The im p etu s for m entalism is the notion that, being in the light, ou r rational actions (thou ght rather than feeling) resu lt, for everything is available to the (cau sal) rationality that consciou sness confers: hence the u se of the term access, by e.g. Block 1995 or global accessibility 2001, and d istingu ished from the egoism ic phenomenal. 7 H ence, ind eed , cognitive science. As old as the Greeks, and still not com p rehensible. For light is not an intrinsic p rop erty of electrom agn etic rad iation: it is just (brain-m ad e) w hat w e see (so far u nd efined ), or facilitates ou r seeing; it confers no access as know led ge (w here know led ge is taken as: rep resentation of w hat is to a su bject).
Ou r analysis offers a d ifferent interp retation. If t he p henom enon is p hysical, and not m erely su p ervenient u p on the p hysical, then its cau sality resu lts from its being p hysical. Bu t it is not, as David son (1970) attem p ted to com p rom ise, that m ental events cau se p hysical events in a law -like m anner only u nd er p hysical d escrip tion. Being p hysical, the p henom enon itself (as a state) m u st be d escribable as p hysicality (i.e. w hat is a p hysical thought, a p hysical feeling? and w hy are they not necessarily cau sal?). Therefore if the p henom enon has cau sal im p lications, its natu re as p hysicality m u st be revealed , not fu d ged as som e u nanalysable (i.e. herm etically self-d efining) su p ervenient featu re. 8 It w ill not be cau sal for the organism becau se its fu nction is not m ass/ energy sp ace -tim e, thou gh its existence is. And becau se of this, w e d o not conclu d e that no cau sality is involved in its fu nction. To clarify this requ ires exp licating the biology. 9 5 This is not intended to preclude causality in the organism which does not include the brain. 6 An obvious reference is to the Cave Parable in Plato"s Republic. But that is preceded by (not least) the Presocratic fragment 64 in the Diels-Kranz numeration of Heraclitus, translated as "Thunderbolt steers all things" (Kirk et al. 1983, p197/198); or as Heidegger (1975, p72) interprets it: "But lightning steers (in presencing) the totality (of what is present)". For discussion on the relation to Zeus and earlier notions of the divine sun, see . 7 The notion that content is accessible, i.e. causal, while phenomenal states, or qualia, are not depends upon an a priori definition of mentality, rather than what it could be physically. But since there is no explanation offered of what mentality is causally as physicality (or not), the distinction lacks physical plausibility (cf. note 20). 8 The widespread notion that mental states are propositional attitudes offers no explanation, biologically, of what they are. As Dennett (1994) says: "The most sweeping conclusion I have drawn on the theory of content is that the large and well-regarded literature on propositional attitudes…is a disciplinary artefact of no long term importance whatever, except as history"s most slowly unwinding unintended reductio ad absurdum"( p241). 9 There is no analogy here with Dennett"s (1991b) use of abstracta for beliefs.
THE THEORY OF BRAIN -SIGN
What characterizes a Ku hnian -typ e revolu tion is a reassessm ent of the fu nd am entals. The theory of consciou sness sp ecifies tw o kind s of cau sality for the brain: the realm of p hysicality w hich is neu rop hysiology (often am bigu ou sly term ed u nconsciou s), and another realm w hich is the p rop erties of consciou sness. Instead w e p rop ose one realm of c au sality for the brain, electro/ chem ical neu rop hysiology. Bu t there is another p hysical fu nction. And that involves a p hysical featu re: the brain p henom enon w e are p u rsu ing. Its cau sality is to be u nd erstood in a d ifferent w ay, a w ay revealed by exp licatin g the biology.
The first p oint reinforces a p reviou s one. There is nothing volu ntary abou t ou r so -called exp eriencing. When I op en m y eyes, I cannot choose w hat to see. My seeing is a given. There is a su p p osition am ongst som e that I can choose w hat I thin k. Bu t there is no m eans by w hich I can choose w hat I think: each ap p earance of a thou ght is a given; there is no step at w hich I can insert an ind ep end ent choice. (What cou ld that m ean?) The sense of choice (as Wegner"s feeling of consciou s w ill) is itself a given (i.e. p art of the biology, as conviction above, 2.2.3). N or can I choose w hat I d o. Althou gh it m ight ap p ear that I consid er op tions, and am ongst those op tions m ake a choice, the sequ ence of the consid eration or choosing is not som ething d u ring w hich I can insert an ind ep end ent evalu ation, or alter w hat hap p ens.
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Of cou rse, freed om as sp irit, sou l or m ind w as a key featu re of consciou sness. The retention of this p rescientific notion exists in Dennett"s m aterialism . In fact, Dennett is a m aterialist d u alist, since his accou nt retains the ghost of freed om beyond p hysicality. Bu t if consciou sness is p hysical, it is w holly d eterm ined , and thu s the m entalist w ord experience (w hich he u ses constantly) is fallaciou s (as w e shall see), since that w ou ld im p ly a (d u alist) self cap able of ind ep end ent (i.e. free) activity as a resu lt of being an exp eriencer in its inner (Cartesian?) realm .
While there is a brain p arad igm that is consciou sness, the organism d oes not relate p hysically to the w orld , bu t to a sim u lacru m of the w orld , now not end ow ed by God , bu t by the brain"s ow n m anu factu re-u nd er som e obscu re (i.e. w ithou t p hysical exp lanation) p rincip le. We d o not thereby grasp the p hysical organism p er se, nor its m od u s op erand i u nd er evolu tionary p rincip les. 11 A Ku hnian-typ e revolu tion w ill not be tow ard s an arcane or strange alternative to the p revailing view (w hich itself is arcaneand strange). It w ill restore the term s of science: p hysicality and p hysical exp lanation, and the theory of evolu tion.
An action theory of the brain
A biological theory grants the brain the cap acity to cau se action for the organism in its encou nter w ith the p hysical w orld . Brain science, therefore, m u st exp lore how the brain achieves this in its p hysical stru ctu re and op eration. It is not that, cu rrently, neu robiologists and neu roscientists d o not engage this task. It is that their w ork is ham p ered by the attem p t to d eterm ine p sychology in the brain, as if that w ere a cau sal m echanism to be accou nted for (cf. 2.1, & notes 2&11). Ross/ Sp u rrett, for exam p le, su ggest that consciou sness resu lts from the effects of d ynam ic system s theory. Bu t w hether that theory, or connectionism , or a com bination of these and m any other kind s of p hysical cau sality are relevant to the brain"s activity, none of them either exp lain consciou sness, or contribu te to find ing p sychology in the brain; or, m ore fu nd am entally, justify the notion of consciou sness in the first p lace (cf. Seager on Dennett, note 4). 10 The topic here relates to the notion of free will. Books continue to be written, including one edited by Gary Watson in 2003. However, his earlier statement (1995) could not be more apposite, or more indicative of why this is a non-topic. "While subsequent developments have sharpened and focused the issues, the basic questions remain what they were in the seventeenth century" (p181). Exactly. 11 In their widely read student text, Bear et al. (2006) state: "Exactly how the parallel stream of sensory data are melded into perception, images and ideas remains the Holy Grail of neuroscience" (p421). The use of the expression "Holy Grail" (unintentional though its irony is) exemplifies the prescientific ground that is being taught to our young people. The brain ad ap ts to the w orld it encou nters for the fu nction of su rvival and rep rod u ction. In so d oing, it bu ild s action p rogram s to control the organism , w hich are end lessly rep eated (cf. e.g. Ed elm an & Tononi 2000). 12 Bu ild ing action p rogram s is by variou s m ethod s: innate cap acities, trial and error, feed back, m im icking of p arents, etc. Pu rsu ing this is a valid p roced u re for brain science.
What is requ ired is a new neurophysiological language that m ap s brain stru ctu re and op eration to the actions of the organism in the fu lfillm ent of its biological fu nction. This w ill not be in the intentional langu age of p sychology. It w ill likely be a d escrip tion of nested and overlap p ing stru ctu res and states w ithin, below , above and ap art from the ind ivid u al neu ron level. In d ivesting action of intentional categories, there also need s be a significantly enhanced d escrip tion of categories of action in the w orld .
This new neu rop hysiological langu age d oes not d ep end u p on an assu m p tio n of ou r ow n consciou sness in its exp ression. Ind eed , w hatever allow s u s to rend er this non -intentional d escrip tion of brain cau sality is other than consciou sness. N ow w e w ant to know how that is achieved . So w e tu rn to…
The rationale for brain-sign
Withou t m oving from the p hysicality of d ynam ic system s theory, or connectionism , etc. as p ossible exp ositions of cau sality, w e find the neu rop hysiology of the brain facing a fu nd am ental p roblem . It is not that it is em bed d ed in the w orld of its action, and therefore requ ires som e symbolic m eans of p rocessing its inform ation ind ep end ent from the em bed d ing (w hy w ou ld it need that?). 13 N or d oes it need to (or cou ld ) create a workspace of m ental p rop erties that som ehow interact and are available (globally!) to p u rely p hysical p rop erties. (Descartes" u nsolved interactionist p roblem 350+ years on.) N o, the brain p roblem is as follow s. Or rather, it is not a brain p roblem . What w e shall d escribe is a featu re from the evolu tionary p rocess.
Brain-to-brain communication
If w e accep t the brain has an action cau sing relation to the w orld for the organism , then w e need no lu m inou s cau sal inner state of corresp ond ence to the ou ter p hysical w orld . Bu t, then, how d o ou r sep arate neu rop hysiologies com m u nicate? H o w can p u rely physical states of the brain enter into collective activity? The elim ination of the im p lau sible, consciou sness, seem s to land u s w ith the im p ossible. 12 E.g. "In a…detailed model of cortical areas, which included interconnected thalamic regions, we…examined the dynamics of reentrant interactions within the thalamocortical system…That such a self-perpetuating dynamic process, characterised by the strength and speed of reentrant neural interactions, can originate from the connectivity of the thalamocortical system is of considerable significance for understanding the actual neural events that underlie the unity of consciousness" pp119-120. Edelman"s notion of the re-entrancy of neural structure in being causal is the analogy for "building programs" that we are making. But Edelman"s "unity of consciousness", a notion derived from Kant"s transcendental unity of apperception, and by contrast with his (Edelman"s) notion of neural integration (also termed binding), is causally superfluous. What remains at issue, however, is how and where the phenomenon is integrated for the function it performs, as discussed. 13 Kim Sterelny"s (2003) interesting book, with much empirical reference, on what he calls decoupled representations, or belieflike capacities, suffers from two problems in the context of the present paper. Since he scarcely mentions the word consciousness (with its associated ontological difficulties), we must suppose that, in using expressions like perception and sensation, or when he refers to mental operations as belief or desire, he means conscious manifestations, and not purely physical-neural implementations. But then he does not clarify why we should use the word belief (or mental) for structures that have not been shown to be causal-physical by any adequate theory. Moreover, causally, so-called beliefs/desires as so-called consciousness are not inevitably deterministic in operation, i.e. we do not necessarily act on our beliefs and desires. On the other hand, and more profoundly, if there are mechanisms that entail an organism not necessarily reacting directly to a stimulus but delaying, or as he says, having a more general usage across different kind of behavior (decoupled), why should we suppose that physicality is implementing (e.g.) a belief? For neurophysiology may cause behavior (perhaps on a large scale of neural structure/operation) which has nothing to do with an architecture of beliefs and desires, which wholly derive from what consciousness is deemed to give/be. As we say elsewhere, the notion of mental states is then fatally obfuscatory to the understanding of what the neurophysiology is actually doing. Both these problems apply to the whole literature of folk psychology.
From an evolu tionary p oint of view , this w ill be u nd erstood d ifferently. Clearly (to u s) the solip sistic organism is a p oor organism , in that its m eans of environm ental ad ap tation are severely lim ited . Collective action rend ers far richer cap abilities since actions can be shared and thu s be m ore com p lex so, by chance and selection, allow ing sp ecies to be m ore fit in the environm ent.
What d oes this im p ly? N ot that collective action is the coop eration of consciou s ind ivid u als, bu t rather resu lts from w hat w e d escribe as a collective organism , or su p erorganism . From ou r conclu sion that the action of ind ivid u al organism s resu lts from neu rop hysiological p rogram s, w e then su p p ose that collective action resu lts from su p raorganism ic neu rop hysiological p rogram s. In w hich case the interaction, the coop eration, of ind ivid u al organism s is genetically end ow ed and learned at an ind ivid u al and su p raneu rop hysiological level. (H ere is a cru cial fu nction for m irror neu rons.)
Still, the situ ation is m ore com p lex than these statem ents im p ly becau se the natu re of the tasks the su p er-organism can im p lem ent m u st be con sid ered . They w ill be d ivid ed into tw o classes. These are categorized by w hat u sed to be term ed closed and op en instincts, bu t are now m ore cu stom arily term ed stereotyp ical and m od ifiable behavioral p atterns. The closed or stereotyp ical category ind icates an inherited genetic behavioral activity w hich is resistant to change u nd er environm ent-exp osu re influ ence, w hereas the op en or m od ifiable category ind icates that there is an intrinsic cap ability of m od ification.
We em p hasize that w e are not referring to t he behavioral p attern of the ind ivid u al, bu t the communication mechanism betw een ind ivid u als. Clearly this is a severe constraint u p on the ind ivid u al since, for com m u nication to w ork, the coop eration of a p op u lation of ind ivid u als is requ ired u nd er som e stability, w hereas an ind ivid u al"s m od ifiability (or ad ap tability) in its ow n actions concerns only itself.
Tw o classes of communication
Taking this p oint as analytically cru cial, w hat w e p rop ose is that, w hereas there are insect grou p s w hich are socially com p lex (e.g. bees, ants, term ites), their interactions are not d ynam ic. This is becau se the effects of their social activities can be achieved from stereotyp ical behavioral com m u nications. On the other hand other sp ecies can coop erate in tasks w here the behavior of the interaction is not by nature stereotyp ical. Thu s althou gh w hat is achieved as a society m ay even seem less im p ressive, the cap acity for interaction requ ires a fu nd am entally d ifferent m od ality.
The contrast to be d raw n is betw een bees and hu nting lions. This w ill be u sed as a p arad igm exam p le. In both cases the cau sal p rop erties of the action taken, both ind ivid u ally and coop eratively, lie w ith the neu rop hysiology of the organism s" brains. In the case of the bee d ance, the signing bee"s brain cau ses it to p erform the ap p rop riate m ovem ents, even in the d arkness of the hive, w hich w ill m od ify the receiving bee"s neu rop hysiology su ch that it w ill set off in p u rsu it of the nectar. The stereotyp ical com m u nication is the m eans of this behavior m od ification, althou gh the actu al signing w ill vary d ep end ing u p on w hat d irections are being conveyed . The bee"s search m ay involve d ifferent kind s of cu es, inclu d ing the p osition of the su n and land scap e ind icators. Bu t w e d o not su p p ose anything m ore th an neu rop hysiological reaction to the p hysical cu es are necessary, obtained by sensory inp u t. There is no evid ence (e.g.) that bees have m ental m ap s of the land scap e (cf. Sterelny"s literatu re d iscu ssion, 2003) . N or d o w e su p p ose that bees think abou t w hat they are d oing.
The brain-sign requirement
The qu estion arises, therefore, w hether m ore u np red ictable com m u nication requ ires (m ental) p ercep tion or thou ght or feeling. We consid er this in relation to lions w ho can hu nt coop eratively. What d istingu ishes the com m u nication situ ation w ith lions from that of bees is that, in the coop erative act of lions, there is an essential u ncertainty or im p recision d u ring the hu nt. For, since each lion takes accou nt of the m ovem ents of the p rey (zebra or gazelle, e tc.), and the other lions" m ovem ents, and the terrain u p on w hich the hu nt takes p lace, there cannot be, in the sam e w ay as w ith bees, a stereotyp ical com m u nicative m echanism . It rem ains the case that the neu rop hysiology is d oing the cau sal w ork for the ind ivid u al lion w ith sensory inp u t, and this is to be seen as in the natu re of a su p er -organism . And if the su p er-organism w ere genu inely that, then the hu nt p rocess cou ld be com p letely cond u cted by the neu rop hysiology of the su p er -organism . Bu t there is an absolu te d ivid e betw een the nod es of the su p er-organism , i.e. the p hysical d istance betw een each ind ivid u al lion"s brain. Therefore a new factor is introd u ced .
There is a requ irem ent, or m ore p recisely, an evolved cap acity for neu ral signification to take p lace betw een these nod es (i.e. in the brain of each lion) that, as it w ere, closes the loop of the cau sal p rocess (in p rincip le). The signification is of the continu ally changing causal neural status of each lion"s brain. For lion A, the view of the w orld it receives d u ring the hu nt p rocess is the sensory inp u t of the zebra on the terrain and the other lions (B and C). Whilst lion A"s neu rop hysiology controls w hat it d oes as an organism in resp onse, it also cau ses a sign in its brain of the "view " to w hich it is resp ond ing. By this m eans, all the lions" neu rop hysiologies are linked both cau sally and signifyingly in the p rocess of the hu nt. Moreover, w e m ay su p p ose that lion A"s brain also has an internal (as op p osed to external) elem ent, the resp onse to p hysical activation in relation to the hu nt, w hich m ay be cod ed as p art of the neu ral sign along w ith the scene, w hat w e m is -term excitement. The w hole neu ral sign w e term brain-sign, and it rep laces the notion of consciou sness for the neu ral p henom enon. This is a novel concep t, so recap itu lation m ay help . In the case of bees, com m u nication is straightforw ard , in that the sign conveyed in the w orld by the m ovem ents of the signing bee can be absorbed by the neu rop hysiology of the receiving bee becau se signs, in their variations, are circu m scribed and rep eatable, and the ensu ing task w holly carried ou t by the ind ivid u al. For hu nting lions, a d ifferent scenario exists. There is no constant rep etition of a lim ited range of sign featu res then acted u p on by each ind iv id u al: in the hu nt there is continu al coop erative novelty that each hu nting lion"s brain m u st absorb and act u p on. Althou gh the neu rop hysiology of each lion is cap able of d irecting the lion"s actions in relation to this novelty (and is vastly com p u tationally com p lex), the missing featu re is the com m u nicative featu re (of lim ited com p lexity w ithou t com p u tation content) for the su p raorganism ic hu nt program. This com m u nicative featu re that hold s the lions together as the hu nt is the signifying neu ral sign in each lion of w hat the cau sal neu rop hysiology is reacting to. Thu s cau sally, lion A"s neu rop hysiology reacts to the hu nt environm ent; bu t it signifies this environm ent by the sign of it that it m anu factu res: the brain -sign. If you like, this sign is the elem ental reason for the lion"s actions (in the su p ra -organism ic p rogram ). Reason, here, is sp ecifically a signification of cau se. Bu t it is not cau se. Bees need no su ch reasons, for there is nothing to be exp lained betw een them : their task is a rigid enactm en t of a sp ecific w ay of behaving in their fu nctional social stru ctu re, com p lex thou gh it is.
Obviou sly, in the case of lions, the neu ral signification of the environm ent of the hu nt p rogram is a m u tu al reference. Bu t it is not a reference to a m ental su bject. It is a reference that acts biologically betw een ind ivid u al organism s facilitating coop erative action on a su p raorganism ic causal p rogram to w hich, as the sign, it (the reference) has no access. A sign, a reason, a reference…and an agreement, since the zebra is the target of all the lions" neu rop hysiologies. Thu s w e see that d u alism is rem oved , for the sign of cau sality as reason, reference and agreem ent, is a w holly p hysical fu nction. Signs, u nlike the Greek/ Christian consciou sness, or Dennett"s cau sal intentional consciou sness, are red u cible (w e w ill retu rn to this).
There is no qu estion: If the cau sal neu rop hysiology can m anage the hu nt p rogram , w hy is there signification? becau se cau sality and signification are how d ynam ic coop eration takes p lace. Withou t signification, the hu nt cou ld not fu nction. Ind eed , w e now have a genu ine biogenesis for the p henom enon. 14 We d o not sep arate m entality and action; brain -sign arises sp ecifically to signify in the action p rocess. Action (p otential or actu al) also effe cts m em ory or im agination, the conveying of the action -related p ast or p ossible. Cau sality and signification are d istinct m echanism s: the ram ifications of this w ill becom e evid ent.
It m ight occu r to the read er that the notion of brain -sign is bizarre becau se no lion can look insid e another lion"s brain to see the sign. Bu t this resu lts from retaining the (d u alist) notion of consciou sness w hilst trying to u nd erstand brain -sign theory. In the p hysical w orld , there is no p ercep tion. Brain -sign occu rs for the su p ra-organism ic p rogram taking p lace across brains. It is a featu re of that p rogram , not som e other w ay of sp ecifying w hat hap p ens concerning p ersons, becau se for a su p er -organism , there are no p ersons (or lion p ersons). To grasp brain-sign theory necessitates the giving u p all associations w ith w hat consciou sness is d eem ed to give. This requ ires p ractice. Ind eed , to see that brain -sign is not ep ip henom enal is a step in the grasp of the biology.
Language
Langu age is regard ed as the d istinctive featu re of hu m ans, d istingu ishing them from other sp ecies (thou gh e.g. w hales and d olp hins rem ain enigm as on this, Rend ell & Whitehead , 2001). Becau se langu age allow s hu m ans to d isengage from the rigid ity of the actionconnection w ith the things of the w orld , it is su p p osed hu m ans can consid er those things sym bolically and analytically. Moreover, since hu m ans share langu age, p rop ositional and exp ressive com m u nication abou t states of the w orld and ou rselves can be d isengaged from those states. Langu age is the last fu nd am ental d ifference betw een ou rselves and other anim als to w hich ou r self-regard clings.
Brain-sign theory d isagrees. It claim s the p hysical fu nction of langu age has been m isu nd erstood , for no accou nt of biology is engaged . Chom sky, for exam p le, u s es the exp ression "m ind / brain", thu s ind icating, since m ind and brain are not exp licitly d eterm ined (and d eliberately so), that no biological theory u nd erp ins his langu age theory. (H e is skep tical, thou gh, that langu age depends u p on engaging consciou sness.) 15 As w ith p ercep tion for hu nting lions, w e m u st sp ecify how langu age is in the p hysical w orld . It seem s to be that w hich w e hear, and that w hich w e read . Bu t these are brain -sign fu nctions, m anu factu red by the brain as casu al signification. Su rely langu ag e d oes com m u nicative w ork, bu t not cau sal w ork for the organism . What, then, goes on w ith langu age?
In the p hysical w orld , langu age is stru ctu red m arks on e.g. p ap er or a com p u ter screen. The brain absorbs these m arks by stru ctu red states of transd u ced ele ctrom agnetic rad iation. In taking in these m arks, the brain is not engaging w ith sem antics. Su ch a su p p osition w ou ld have to exp lain how the neu ral brain could absorb stru ctu red m arks as m eaning and then em p loy it cau sally. There is no m eaning in electrom a gnetic rad iation or neu ral stru ctu re. Yet it seem s, by the tim e w e see langu age on the p ap er, w e recognize it, that w hich has fam iliarity. H ere, for exam p le, is Fod or (1987) in Psychosemantics: "To u nd erstand a sentence is to grasp the thou ght that its u tterance stand ard ly conveys" (p 151). Bu t Fod or d oes not tell u s w hat understand entails, nor grasp nor thought. N o theory cogently sp ecifies these as biology. So, as w ith p ercep tion, w e reject the notion that a p erson"s m ind contains (in its inner state) langu age to w hich they are orientated by (cau sal) recognitional understanding. 16 The brain m anu factu res the state of "seeing" the langu age and the sense of fam iliarity becau se it has so ad ap ted by p ast exp osu re, and that is its physical function. (Sim ilarly w h en w e hear langu age from stru ctu red com p ression w aves.) Bu t w hy is that its fu nction?
Ou r d iscu ssion of p ercep tion offers a read y answ er. We "see" or "hear" langu age becau se that is neu ral signification in the com m u nication p rocess w ith others. We d o not do anything becau se of w hat w e see or hear, becau se ou r actions, or p otential actions, are cau sed by the p hysical activity of ou r brains from absorbing the electrom agnetic rad iation or com p ression w aves inp u t. Learning to u se langu age is learning com m u nicat ive behavior in the p hysical w orld p er se. Com m u nicative behavior resu lts from neu ral m od ification. In other w ord s, there is no cau sal p roblem arising from sem antics becau se sem antics is irrelevant as is syntax. Sem antics and syntax are the making sense as brain-sign, i.e. as ou r state "takes itself to be" as a com m u nicative m echanism .
N ow w e see the issu e at 2.1 w ith interp reting fMRI scanning. In N eville et al."s exam p le (1998), w hat is likely illu m inated in the Broca and Wernicke areas for both hearing read ers of langu age and d eaf ASL read ers of signs is cau sal p rocessing of langu age. The activation of the su p erior tem p oral gyru s in d eaf read ers is also cau sal p rocessing, as is the case w ith hearers of sp oken langu age. Brain -sign as com m u nication, how ever, is a d ifferent fu nction. Of cou rse this d oes not solve brain -sign location, or its m eans of integration.
In being the brain-sign p rod u ct "seeing" or "hearing", w e have no access to the cau ses of ou r actions or p otential actions. The brain cou ld not overcom e this d ivision by its m echanism of self-interp retation from cau sal states to brain -sign. Verbal interp retation (as brain -sign) is bou nd ed by the p hysical m echanism s of the brain itself w hich are not know led ge. 17 We m isinterp ret this ad ap tation fu nd am ent ally if w e su p p ose (e.g.) exp ressed beliefs constitute cau sality. The brain believes nothing.
For exam p le: A read er of this p ap er is trad itionally su p p osed to be attem p ting to u nd erstand its content, and then p erhap s m ake a d ecision on w hether they agree w ith (w e m ight say believe) it. Bu t how cou ld a neu ral brain w eigh evid ence and m ake a ju d gm ent as to rightness or w rongness (or tru th or falsity)? A neu ral brain p rocesses stru ctu red p hysical inform ation, orientating itself tow ard s action. Thu s the read ing of the p ap er is the p rocess of colonization of the read er"s neu ral stru ctu re and op eration by the w riter"s brain. As brainsign, the read er "sees" and "u nd erstand s" the w ord s/ concep ts. Becau se they are this brain -sign of "seeing" and "u nd erstand ing", both the read er"s and w riter"s brains can be in a state of signifying sim ilarity concerning the p otential action they m ight p erform . Thu s they (i.e. brain-signs) can be p hysical neu ral com m u nication.
Still, w hat m ay be d ifferent is that the w riter, as brain -sign, has the sense of rightness of the content, w hereas the read er m ay have a sense of confu sion or d isagreem ent. So action likely w ou ld not coincid e. Bu t confu sion and d isagreem ent are no m ore accu rate in term s of corresp ond ence to an u nd erlying reality th an is the sense of rightness. The brain is a p roactive/ reactive p hysical organ, not a container of the right and the w rong, not a p arallel reality of the Greek/ Christian trad ition.
The w riter cannot persuade the read er of rightness. Persu asion entails m ent alism . The w riter"s brain (biologically) colonizes the read er"s brain in the p hysical p rocess of read ing: it is for brain science to ascertain the neu ral m echanism w hereby the read er"s actions m ight or m ight not resu lt in p ositive influ ence from neu ral m od ification. 18 It is also for brain science to d eterm ine the m eans by w hich a related brain -sign occu rs. It is not for brain science to d eterm ine how brains interp ret sem antics. One fu rther observation. In read ing or listening to langu age, as brain -sign w e are not only w hat w e "see" and "hear" lingu istically. Also p resent are "im ages", "senses", "feelings" of varying intensity. Bu t how cou ld hearing the w ord (e.g.) mountain evoke the associated im ages and senses? Mentalism w ou ld have it that one m ental state causes another, the heard w ord mountain cau ses the im age (bu t w hy this one?). There is no scientific exp lanation for this. Brain-sign theory p rop oses a d ifferent accou nt. Stru ctu red electrom agnetic rad iation or com p ression w aves, as p hysically transd u ced stim u li, activate neu ral stru ctu res generating the "seen" or "heard " w ord mountain, bu t also other facets like "im ages" and "sensations" becau se of cau sally associated neural architectu re. What evid ence d o w e d raw for this? The exp erim ents of Wild er Penfield (1958) , w here electrical stim u lation of areas of the cortex (i.e. physical stim u lation) generated com p rehensive im ages, sp eech, sensations, ap p arently as qu asi-m em ories.
THE N ATURE OF BRAIN -SIGN
Althou gh only a few characteristics of brain -sign have been m entioned , p articu larly p ercep tion and langu age, w e can d raw som e help fu l d istinctions betw een it and consciou sness.
Brain-sign vs. consciousness
The theory of consciou sness m u st not only exp lain w hat m ental entities are, it m u st exp lain m ental processing. Bu t how w ou ld the brain p rocess in a m od ality d ifferent from w hat it is: p hysical cau sality? N ew theories ap p ear regu larly (e.g. Dam asio 2000) . 19 Bu t no exp lanation w ill reconcile the term s becau se the attem p t to m ake the m ind p hysical start s w ith a p rescientific m od el d evised for a d ifferent ontological rationale from the u niverse of p hysicality. 20, 21 Brain-sign theory byp asses this becau se its origins are in the m aterial of w hich w e are m ad e. Tw o sep arate bu t linked m echanism s exist in the br ain: one, the cau sal p rop erties d eterm ining w hat the organism d oes; the other, a signifying statu s for com m u nication betw een sep arate neu rop hysiologies d erived from the cau sal m echanism .
Cru cially, since each organism "s history w ill resu lt in a d ifferent neu ral/ cau sal relation to the w orld , consciou sness = know led ge (that w hich is to a su bject, 2.3) cannot exist, since brain-sign is an interp retation of each brain"s d ifferent ad ap ted cau sal relation to the w orld . For com m u nication, how ever, brain -sign serves. 19 Antonio Damasio"s (2000) is a variation on higher order theory, but lacks explanation of how physicality becomes mentality. He says: "Many of us in neuroscience are guided by one goal and one hope: to provide, eventually, a comprehensive explanation for how the sort of neural pattern that we can currently describe with the tools of neurobiology, from molecules to systems, can ever become the multidimensional, space-and-time integrated image we are experiencing this very moment" (p322). In other words, he has no theory. His commitment to the Greek/Christian tradition is seen in the following: "The drama of the human condition thus comes from consciousness because it concerns knowledge obtained in a bargain that none of us struck: the cost of a better existence is the loss of innocence about that very existence" (p316). There is no characterisation here in terms of the physical world, nor is knowledge given any scientific definition. 20 As Kim (2005) ranges over theories of reducibility proposed recently, "the new materialism", there is no mention, by the proposers, that both the function and nature of the mental are undefined as physicality. In other words, the predicament of us as experiencers-appearers (cf. 2.2.2) as biology is unnoticed. Dennett has taken the correct position in not accepting that consciousness can be ascertained entirely from within. The problem is, he does not disengage from the tradition adequately (cf. note 4). 21 Cf. Peschl (1999) : "It is not the goal of the neural representation system to map the environment as accurately as possible [i.e. perceptual knowledge] but to generate functionally fitting behavior" (p187).
Brain-sign as physical state
Psychology, as a d iscip line, is fou nd ed u p on m any fu nctions: p ercep tion, thou ght, feeling, etc., and innu m erable others: hop e, exp ectation, fear, ind u lgence, forgiveness, terror, and so on. The brain su p p osed ly m an u factu res this vast com p lex so it can be cau sal as them .
If w e banish p sychology w e elim inate these sep arate fu nctions, and grant one cau sal kind of thing, the p hysical brain. This d oes not m ean the brain itself is not stru ctu red in d ifferent fu nctions; brain im aging ind icates that they are located in sp ecific areas (cf. 2.1), thou gh how this op erates is still in d ebate (cf. 3.1).
The d erivative brain p henom enon, how ever, is of one kind . There are no p sychological typ es as ind ivid u al cau sal fu nctions, bu t t here are d ifferent signifying typ es of one kind : brain-sign.
Consciou sness theory p rop oses w e know the content ou r ow n states. They self-reveal how w e ap p roach the w orld , and w hat cau ses ou r actions in it. Brain -sign recasts the brain p henom enon fu nctionally. For exam p le, the brain d oes not engage a tree neu trally as a m ere seeing of it, even thou gh w e (as brain -sign) m ay su p p ose w e are gazing at it ind ifferently. This is becau se the brain is alw ays action -orientated . Even if w e d o not seem em otionally or critically or attentionally orientated tow ard the tree, w e cannot ju d ge this from the p henom enon w e are, for tw o reasons. Firstly, since the fu nction of the p henom enon is com m u nication w ith other brains, w e cannot assess the neural nature of ou r state, i.e. its p hysical relation to the w orld actu ally. This is tru e sp ecifically of attention (often a featu re of "p sychological" testing). We d o not choose to p ay attention: ou r d irected ness is already a state of neu ral orientation, w hich a tester"s brain m ay hav e cau sed u s, as test-su bjects, to be in. If w e find w e are p aying attention, this is alread y a new orientation and entails loss of attention. Second ly, we can never ju d ge of ou r ow n states, for there is no (m ental) we to d o so no reflective cap ability.
If, for exam p le, w e "reflect" that w e find this tree attractive, are w e ju d ging of the tree or of ou r ow n state? N either. The brain, creating brain -sign, signifies its cau sal statu s. Firstly, w e "see" the tree as beau tifu l becau se w e are held before it as a resu lt of its configu ration and p rop erties. In (exp ressibly) "reflecting" that the tree is beau tifu l, ou r brains com m u nicate their cau sal neu ral orientation. An anim al, by contrast, m ay be held before a tree, bu t since it cannot externalize its state-it has no langu age cau sally to influ ence another anim al-its brain-sign m od ality w ill not be exp ressible as "langu age" that cou ld alter another"s cau sal state. Thu s w e see how so-called reflection can be exp lained for u s (as neu ral exp ression), and w hy it cannot exist for m ost anim als. Bu t it is not reflection (a m ental p rop erty).
Langu age is not som e new m agic featu re of hu m ans; it is an evolved extension of alread y existing m echanism s. 22 Mentalism has been p reoccu p ied w ith a life-long I, the su bject of m ental su bjectivity, and the being of the p erson. Bu t there are tw o cou nters to this, the first from brain -sign theory itself. Since brain-sign exists at this m om ent, and is d erived from the cau sal statu s of the brain, and this w ill never be id entically rep eated , it is im p ossible for there to be an end u ring I. The I is an exp ression of the m om ent, and is w eld ed to im m ed iate content. The second is that since brain-sign p erform s no ep istem ological fu nction for the brain (cf. 2.2.2), there is no w ay of fou nd ing the p ossibility that the I now w as the I of the p ast or that of the fu tu re. The sense of the "I" is a biological m arker of this organism in com m u nication now, not the Cartesian I of the sou l, or the Kantian logical I by w hich exp erience can be consistently ou rs. 23 This sense of the "I", as of the conviction of right and w rong, or Wegner"s feeling of w ill, is a constru ct of the brain for com m u nication. Thu s egoism , as a m ethod ological -ontological p rincip le for m ental states, is d isbarred . N o I exists to exp erience, nor to w hom ap p earances ap p ear.
Brain-sign as neural self-interpretation
Mentalism p rop oses that p hysical inp u t to the brain is tu rned into a d ifferent kind of existent and then p rocessed as su ch by the brain. For action, this has to be tu rned back into p hysicality to cau se m otor resu lts. The ju stification is that w e ap p ear to be this d ifferent existent. We have raised fu nd am ental objections to that p osition. 24 When w e u se the exp ression "neu ral self-interp retation" as brain -sign w e m ean the follow ing. Action, for exam p le in seeing a tree thence going u p to tou ch it, resu lts from the brain "accessing" the tree as p hysical sensory and neu ral p rocessing. This, then, translates into m otor actions of the requ isite typ e. To effect action, the brain u ses e d ge d etection, featu re d etection, m otion d etection, rad iation w ave-length d etection, all of w hich are cau sal as p hysical states. Brain science shou ld d eterm ine how the brain is so op erative. N onetheless the brain d oes have the cap acity to m ake from them a neu ral im age for com m u nication p u rp oses becau se the stru ctu re is "p resu p p osed " or "p refabricated ", as an assem bly, in the action. To that im age is ad d ed other featu res, as w e have d iscu ssed , form ing the w hole of brain -sign at this m om ent. The inevitable d elay betw een the brain"s cau sal activity and w hat w as taken to be ou r exp erience, the d elay id entified by Libet et al. (1983) , is exp lained by the sep arate fu nctions of cau sality and signification.
A cru cial criterion valid ating the brain -sign accou nt over m entalism is error, or m isrep resentation. The im age "w e see" is not a replication of w hat is there. It is an interp retation by the brain of w hat it takes to be there in term s of its cau sal relation to it, fou nd ed u p on a history of ad ap tation. Thu s error ca n enter the p rocess becau se w hat w e see is rep resentation via cau sality. Thu s w e can see d og for cat, street light for tree, becau se the im age d oes not covary w ith the w orld to m ental p rocessing, bu t com m u nicates how the organism m ay or w ill cau sally react to w hat it takes to be there from its established states. 25 The com p arison w e m ake for brain -sign, as a sign, is w ith the cham eleon"s skin. The cham eleon"s brain can m ake of its skin, a cellu lar stru ctu re, p atterns and reflectance that w ork as a su rvival m echanism becau se a p red ator"s brain cannot d istingu ish the cham eleon from its su rrou nd ings. 26 N o requ irem ent exists for ontological rep lication betw een the skin configu ration and the su rrou nd ings. Sim ilarly, brains com m u nicate by m aking, of neu ral stru ctu res in the brain, brain -signs; states w ith no requ ired ontological rep lication of the w orld . Thu s, w hile m entality has no evolu tionary p recu rsor, brain -sign has. Signification is w id esp read in biology.
It is obviou s, how ever, that brain -sign is hu gely w astefu l, since m ost com m u nication is not established betw een organism s. Bu t this d erives from the fact that m ost of the brain"s action orientation is not activated actu ally, in e.g. "m em ory" and "im agination". H ow ever, the brain cannot sw itch itself off w hen it cannot com m u nicate (cf. Wegner 2002, p 28) .
Althou gh w e cannot su p p ort Sartre"s (1943) view of consciou sness, of his m any p enetrating notions, that of the fu tile aim of the pour-soi (read consciou sness) to be an en -soi (read the p hysical w orld ) is rem arkably ap p osite. Mod ern p hilosop hy, in looking for m indbrain red u ction, exp ou nd s this fu tility. For w e are not cau sally in the w orld as brain-sign; w e are a sign of a state that is cau sally in the w orld , and to w hich, p er se, w e have no op erative access.
CON CLUSION
What need s to be said on this top ic has been m inim ally tou ched u p on. H ow ever, these m u st be the last rem arks.
As brain-sign, w e seem to w rite w hat w e think, reach for w hat w e see, and com m ent on how w e feel. H ow ever, "thinking", "seeing" and "feeling" have no cau sal im p act on w riting, reaching and com m enting. Ind eed , it is becau se of their sep aration, and the m isinterp reted evid ence concerning this, that the theory of consciou sness had to d evelop an u nconsciou s, or non-consciou s, to su stain itself. Bu t that only m ad e the p roblem of consciou sness m ore obscu re. For althou gh w e seem to w rite w hat w e think, or reach for w hat w e see, there is an u nbrid geable gu lf betw een e.g. ou r seeing and reaching, since they are cau sed by different m echanism s, and can resu lt in a com p lete lack of corresp ond ence betw een them . This is ap p arent in the Titchener circles illu sion (Milner & Good ale, 1995) , w here m otor actions ap p ear d ivorced from visu al rep resentation.
Ind eed , science cannot d ep end u p on m ental states with their inner know led ge cap acity, as trad itionally su p p osed (cf. Giere 2000, p . 523) . Science and technology are ad ap tive biological activities of the neu ral brain as neu rop hysiology (cf. Peschl, 1999) .Bu t science cou ld not op erate w ithou t the ability of inter-organism / brain com m u nication, w hich is brain sign.
Thu s brain-sign, and the new neu rop hysiological m ap p ing langu age for action, are not new nam es for fam iliar fu nctions. Entirely new d escrip tive m ethod s w ill be involved for each, reconstru cting fu nd am entally ou r view of ou rselves, and other organism s. The new neu rop hysiological m ap p ing langu age allow s d escrip tion in term s of p hysicality, i.e. an escap e from the fu tile attem p t to locate p sychology in the brain.
Brain-sign and consciou sness offer d ifferent accou nts of the brain p henom enon w e are. H ow w ill w e ju d ge w hich is correct? As w ith all top ics in science, the answ er is: by exp erim ent-thou gh this w ill be bou nd ed by the fu nction of brain -sign itself. What is certainly the case, as this text ind icates, is that brain-sign is the only com p rehensive accou nt that m eets the cu rrent evid ence. Moreover, it is the only accou nt that begins from the p hysical w orld , and offers a scientific analysis of how the p henom enon cou ld have evolved and fu nction in the brain, w ith a red u cible ontology and necessary biological role.
